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CURRENT DECISIONS
AGENcY-EsToPPEL-AcTiONS Ex DELIcro.The plaintiff was injured by an
automobile owned and driven by A. The plaintiff sued B as employer of A.
The evidence showed that B had sold out to C, who retained the seller's name
and location. The lower court allowed the plaintiff to recover on the ground
of estoppel.' Held, that such recovery was error. Jung v. New Orleans Ry.
& Light Co. (igig, La.) 82 So. 870.
As pointed out by the court, estoppel is applied where persons have acted
in good faith in reliance upon representations and have changed their position
so that a denial of the facts as represented would cause them loss. In an
action ex delicto this doctrine cannot be applied to hold one "liable" for the
acts of another who appears to be his agent, because the plaintiff cannot say
he would have acted differently had he known otherwise. To do so would
be to admit contributory negligence. The authorities are not uniform; the
well-reasoned doctrine of the instant case is obviously the sounder one.
AGENcY-ExcLusIvE PRIVILEGE TO SELL.-The plaintiff and the defendant
executed a contract by which the plaintiff was to aid in making sales of land
bought by the defendant from the plaintiff for $I per acre commission. The
plaintiff had shown such land to prospects furnished by the defendant, but
the sale was made not to them, but to other parties with whom the plaintiff
had not negotiated. The plaintiff sued for the commission of $1 per acre.
Held, that he could not recover. Alley v. Griffin (iig, Tex. Civ. App.) 215
S. W. 479.
The court denied recovery on the theory that an "exclusive agency" does not
prohibit the owner himself from selling without incurring the duty to pay the
agent commissions on such sales. This doctrine is reviewed in COMMENT
(1919) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 575. As to the sufficiency of the consideration
in exclusive agency contracts, see (1919) 29 ibid., 115.
CARRIERS-GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION-FUEL ORDERS.-The plaintiff was
the consignee of a shipment of horses transported by the defendant. During
the transmission the horses were so handled that several died after delivery
and the remainder were emaciated. In a suit for damages the defendant
claimed that it was under government control and hence not liable. Held, that
this was no defence. Clapp v. American Express Co. (1919, Mass.) 125
N. E. 162.
This holding is in harmony with what seems to be the weight of authority.
Cf. Witherspoon & Sons v. Postal Telegraph Co. (1919, E. D. La.) 257 Fed.
758; (ig8) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 199; (1919) ibid., 714, 830.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-DUE PROcESS-DAMAGES UPON TERMINATION OF A
FRANCHISE.-A canal company in 1839 obtained the power of eminent domain
to condemn land for canal purposes provided that it should, at all times when
safe to open the locks, permit all boats, etc., of proprietors of abutting
lands to pass through the canal. Such proprietors had previously had access
to deep water through creeks and streams destroyed by the canal. In 1916
the canal company obtained permission from the legislature to abandon its
franchise so far as necessary to permit a railroad to bridge the canal; it then
granted the railroad the privilege of building a bridge shutting off passage
through the canal at that point. The plaintiffs, proprietors of adjoining land,
sued for an injunction against the canal company and the railroad. Held, that
the petition disclosed no cause of action since the privilege of passing terminated
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with the abandonment of the franchise by the consent of the legislature. John-
son v. Lake Drummond Canal & Water Co. (i99, Va.) 99 S. E. 771.
See COMMENTS, supra, p. 431.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-WAR POWERS-PROHIBITION.The plaintiff sued for
an injunction against the United States Attorney and the Collector of Internal
Revenue enforcing against him the penalties provided in the War Time Pro-
hibition Act as amended by the Volstead Act. The plaintiff was manufacturing
beer containing more than o.5 and less than 2.75 per cent. of alcohol. The
plaintiff contended that the question of this beverage being intoxicating was
issuable, that Congress could not probihit the making of non-intoxicating
liquors, and that the prohibition could not without compensation be extended
to liquor acquired before the passage of the act. Held, that a dismissal of the
petition was correct; the vital point being that "there was no appropriation
of private property, but merely a lessening of value due to a permissible restric-
tion imposed upon its use." Ruppert v. Caffey (Jan. 5, x92o) U. S. Sup. Ct.
Oct. Term i919, No. 603.
For discussion of this and the companion cases, see COMMENTS, supra, p. 437.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-WAR POWERS-WARTIME PROHIBITION AND NON-
INTOXICATING LIQUORS.-The defendant was indicted for using food products
in the manufacture for beverage purposes of beer containing one-half of one
per cent. of alcohol, in violation of the War Time Prohibition Act and the Presi-
dent's Proclamations thereunder. The Act was directed against "beer, wine
or other intoxicating malt or vinous liquors!' Held, that a demurrer to the
indictment was properly sustained. United States v. Standard Brewery (Jan.
5, 1920) U. S. Sup. Ct. Oct. Term I919, No. 458.
The court stressed the words or other intoxicating; declared its inability to
rule as matter of law that beverages containing not more than one-half of one
per cent. of alcohol were intoxicating; declined to pass on the power of
Congress to prohibit non-intoxicating liquors; and distinguished Internal
Revenue Department rulings as classifications for purposes of taxation which
could not enlarge criminal liability under Acts of Congress. See further
COMMENTS, supra, p. 437.
CONTRACTS-OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE-SILENCE OF OFFEREE AS ACCEPTANCE-
On March 26, 1917, the defendant's traveling salesman solicited and received
at the plaintiff's country store a written order for 5o barrels of meal, the order
expressly stating that the salesman had no power to make a contract and that
the order should not be binding until accepted by the defendant at its own
office. The meal was to be ordered out by the plaintiff by July 31, or storage
was to be charged thereafter. The salesman continued to make weekly calls
upon the plaintiff, but nothing was said by either party as to this order, until
May 26, when the plaintiff ordered the meal to be shipped. The defendant at
once said that it had not accepted the order. In the meantime war had been
declared and prices had risen. Held, that the defendant's silence for two
months was unreasonable and that it operated as an acceptance of the order.
Cole-.Mclntyre-Norfleet Co. v. Holloway (I919, Tenn.) 214 S. W. 817.
See COMMENTS, supra, p. 441.
COURTS-JURISDICTION-ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OF UNITED STATES SUPREME
CouRT.-The complainant, a citizen of New Jersey, asked leave to file an
original bill against certain United States officers and against the State of
New Jersey for an injunction against the enforcement of the Eighteenth Amend-
ment or legislation under it, on the ground that the amendment was void. Held,
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chat the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction, as section 2, Article 3, of the
Constitution conferring original jurisdiction upon the court "in all cases affect-
ing ambassadors . . . and those in which a State shall be a party . .
merely distributes, and does not confer jurisdiction; and since a citizen may
not sue his sovereign state without its consent. Duhne v. New Jersey (Jan.
12, 192o) U. S. Sup. Ct. Oct. Term 1919.
The decision accords wholly with previous authority. The result desired by
the complainant is, however, being achieved by another road. The daily press
carries reports, under date of January 19, of leave granted Rhode Island,
through its Attorney General, to contest the validity of the amendment and
the enforcement act.
DAMAGES-INTEREST-UNLIQUIDATED AMOUNT-WRONGFUL DEATH.-In an
action under the federal Employers' Liability Act to recover for the death of
her husband, the plaintiff claimed interest on the amount of the verdict from
the date of the death to the time the verdict was returned. Held, that such
interest should not be allowed. Bennett v. Atchison, etc., Ry. (igig, Iowa)
174 N. W. 805.
The court reasoned that the damages must be measured by the amount of
support the widow would have received from the decedent, if he had lived his
expectancy and that the greater part of this would not have been received
until long in the future; and that as it was impossible to calculate the amount
she would have received between the time of death and the verdict, interest on
that amount must also be denied. The decision is in accord with cases collected
in 22 Cyc. 1512, note I.
DAIAGES-WRONGFUL DEATH-FuNERAL ExPNsEs.--In an action for wrong-
ful death the jury was instructed that the funeral expenses should be considered
an element of the damages. Held, that such instruction was error. Brady v.
Haw (1gig, Iowa) 174 N. W. 331.
The reason of the decision was that death was inevitable, and that a burial
would be given at death in a Christian country. Hence, the estate lost, as a
proximate result of the defendant's wrong, only the use of the money during
the expectancy. The theory advanced by the court seems satisfactory. See
Demogue, Validity of the Theory of Compensatory Damages (19x8) 27 YALE
LAW JOURNAL, 585.
EQUITY-BILL OF DiscovEY.--The plaintiff, after the expiration of his patent,
brought an action to recover damages for infringement by the defendant. He
also filed a bill of discovery praying that the defendant be ordered to state
and produce the records of all the profits made from the sale of the article
during the existence of the patent. Held, that the bill be denied. Munger v.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (Nov. 12, igig) C. C. A. 2d, Oct. Term, 1gig,
No. 18.
A bill of discovery is allowed only to obtain the disclosure of facts in the
possession of the defendant which are necessary to. the existence of the cause
of action relied on by the plaintiff. See i Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence
(4th ed. 1918) sec. 2oi. Since the amount of damages was not essential, the
bill in the instant case was properly refused. The court cited a quotation which
suggested that a subpoena duces tecum would have been the proper remedy.
JUDGMENTs-REs JUDICATA-LATER EXISTING RiGnTs-Wmow's AwARD.-
Just prior to their marriage, the plaintiff's husband conveyed his property to
the defendant without consideration. Upon the death of the husband, the
plaintiff probated his will and was granted a widow's award. The estate
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being without funds, she brought an action to have the conveyance to the
defendant set aside or the property charged with the award. Held, that the
defendant should hold the property subject to the award. Deke v. Huenkemeier
(gIg, Il.) x24 N. E. 381.
In a former action, brought by the plaintiff during the marriage, it was held
that the defendant's deed was subject to the plaintiff's inchoate right of dower.
Deke v. Huenkemeier (1913) 26o Ill. 131, 102 N. E. lo5g. This decision is in
accord with the general rule. See (IgIg) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 7O. The
court properly overruled the defendant's contention that the earlier decision
rendered the plaintiff's claim res judicata, no award having been made at that
time.
SALES-BULK SALES AcT-STocK OF MERCHANDISE-RESTAURANT SUPPLIES.-
The plaintiff supplied goods to the defendant's restaurant. While the bill was
still unpaid, the defendant sold the restaurant, including fixtures and canned
goods on hand, to the co-defendants. The provisions of the Bulk Sales Act
were not complied with and the plaintiff claimed that the sale was, therefore,
void as to creditors. The Bulk Sales Act applied to "the sale in bulk . .
of a stock of merchandise." Held, that this was not a sale within the terms
of the Act. Swift & Co. v. Tempelos (1919, N. C.) ioi S. E. 8.
The case raised the question whether a restaurant proprietor sells the food
which he sets before his patrons; the court answered in the negative. Although
the decisions are not entirely harmonious, it is believed the instant case is with
the majority. The cases may be found discussed in COMMENTS (1914) 24 YALE
LAW JOURNAL, 73; and (1918) 27 ibid., io6g, note 3.
TAxATiN-DomICIL-INTENT TO CHANGE.-The petitioner claimed to have an
immunity from paying Virginia taxes. The evidence showed that after leaving
Ohio in igoo with no intent to return, he traveled abroad. Upon his return
he rented for a year and occupied an apartment in Washington, D. C. In
19o5 he purchased a farm in Virginia and prior to 1915 spent the greater por-
tion of each year there, although he continued to frequent health haunts at
regular intervals and to enjoy repeated sojourns in Washington. While absent
from his farm he resided at hotels and apartment houses. He paid a capitation
tax in the county in which his farm was located and reported there his income
for taxation. While away from Virginia he made out the federal income tax
as a resident of Virginia. But when summoned to pay Virginia taxes, he
claimed to be a resident of and domiciled in Washington. Held, that the peti-
tioner was a resident of Virginia. Bowen v. Commonwealth (1919, Va.) xor
S. E. 232.
The court stated correctly that the case "involves fundamentally the problems
of an accurate analysis of that complex aggregate of fact and intention, i. e.,
physical facts and mental facts which go to make up the legal concept of
domicile." Such an analysis will be found in (917) 26 YALE LAW JOURNAL,
796, a considerable portion of the language of which note was apparently
embodied in the opinion of the principal case.
TAXATIoN-INHERITANCE TAXES-DEDUCTION OF FEDERAL ESTATE TAX BEFORE
COMPUTING STATE INHERITANCE TAx.-In assessing the tax imposed by the
Indiana Inheritance Tax Law, the circuit court allowed a deduction from the
value of the decedent's property of the federal estate tax paid by the executor.
The State appealed. Held, that the deduction was proper. State v. First
Calument T. & S. Bank (i919, Ind. App.) 125 N. E. 200.
This decision accords with the view adopted by the majority of the juris-
dictions which have passed upon the problem. Contra, see In re Week's Estate
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(1919, Wis.) 172 N. W. 732. The subject is discussed and earlier authorities
are collected in (1918) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 1055; (1919) 28 ibid., 194, 517.
TAXATION-INHERITANCE TAXES-FEDERAL ESTATE TAX CHARGE ON RESIDUE.-
Executors brought suit for instructions to determine whether the federal estate
tax paid by them should be charged entirely against the residue or apportioned
pro rata among all the devisees and legatees. Held, that the tax was chargeable
against the residue. Plunkett v. Old Colony Trust Co. (1919, Mass.) 124
N. E. 265.
This case accords with the recent New York decision commented upon with
approval in (1919) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 124. The apportionment rule was
declared, but without discussion, in Fuller v. Gale (1918) 78 N. H. 544, lO3
Atl. 3o8.
TAXATION-STOcK TRANSFER TAX-WHAT Is TRANSFER OF TITLE-POwER AS
AN ELEMENT OF TITLE.--A statute imposed a stamp tax upon transfers of shares
of stock. By a voting trust agreement made in 19o8 certain shares were vested
in three trustees. In 1913, by an agreement made by all parties in interest, the
stock was deposited in escrow, and three banks were empowered to procure
the transfer of the stock to themselves by merely filing a copy of a resolution
to that effect with the depository; they were further empowered to cause the
formation of a new voting trust and to cause the stock to be transferred to
the new trustees. Later the banks created new trustees and ordered the stock
to be delivered to them. The state argued that this constituted one transfer
from the old trustees to the banks and a second transfer from the banks to
the new trustees, requiring the payment oi two stamp taxes. Held, that only
one tax was payable. Hudson & M. R. R_ v. State (i919, N. Y.) 125 N. E. 202.
See COMMENTS, supra, p. 429.
TORTS-MALICIOUS PROSECUTION-ABANDONMENT OF SuIT.-The Ad Club of
Birmingham, at the instigation of the defendant, had the plaintiff arrested
for false advertising. Before the trial, the Ad Club instructed the attorney to
drop the case, but he continued prosecution under the orders of the defendant.
The plaintiff was convicted in the recorder's court, but the case was dismissed
on appeal, the prosecutor not appearing. The plaintiff then sued the defendant
for malicious prosecution. The abandonment of the suit by the Ad Club was
admitted as evidence of lack of probable cause for believing the plaintiff was
guilty of the offense charged. Held, that such admission was proper. Parisian
Co. v. Williams (1919, Ala.) 83 So. 122.
It seems that the abandonment by the Ad Club would not be admissible to
show the termination of the original suit, although abandonment of the suit
altogether, by all parties to the prosecution, is admissible on that ground. See
note, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 927, 941, 951. But that should not prevent its admis-
sion as evidence of lack of probable cause in a jurisdiction where abandonment
is allowed as such evidence. See 26 Cyc. 95, notes 3 and 4. For the effect
of a reversed judgment as such evidence, see COMMENT (1920) 29 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 325.
TREATY-MAKING POwER-LEGISLATION UNDER IT CONSTITUTIONAL-MIGRATORY
BIRD TREATY AND Acr.-The Migratory Bird Act of 1913 was held unconstitu-
tional as beyond the scope of federal legislative power. A treaty with Canada
was, therefore, concluded in 1916 for the protection of migratory birds and an
Act passed in 1918 to carry the treaty into effect. Held, that the Act of 1918 was
constitutional. Cases mentioned in COMMENT, note 5.
See COMMENTS, supra, p. 445.
